Идеализам — разлика између измена

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| url =https://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2018/entries/idealism/}}</ref> [[Phenomenology (philosophy)|Phenomenology]], an influential strain of philosophy since the beginning of the 20th century, also draws on the lessons of idealism. In his ''[[Being and Time]]'', [[Martin Heidegger]] famously states: "If the term idealism amounts to the recognition that being can never be explained through beings, but, on the contrary, always is the transcendental in its relation to any beings, then the only right possibility of philosophical problematics lies with idealism. In that case, Aristotle was no less an idealist than Kant. If idealism means a reduction of all beings to a subject or a consciousness, distinguished by staying ''undetermined'' in its own being, and ultimately is characterised negatively as 'non-thingly', then this idealism is no less methodically naive than the most coarse-grained realism."<ref>{{Cite book|title=Being and Time|last=Heidegger|first=Martin|publisher=Klim|year=2006|pages=§43 a}}</ref>
 
== Дефиниције ==
==Definitions==
''Idealism'' is a term with several related meanings. It comes via [[Latin]] ''[[idea]]'' from the [[Ancient Greek]] ''[[idea]]'' (ἰδέα) from ''idein'' (ἰδεῖν), meaning "to see". The term entered the English language by 1743.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/90960|title=idealism, n.|publisher=[[Oxford English Dictionary]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idealism|title=idealism, n.|publisher=[[Merriam-Webster]]}}</ref> It was first used in the abstract metaphysical sense "belief that reality is made up only of ideas" by [[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Christian Wolff]] in 1747.<ref name=SEP/> The term re-entered the English language in this abstract sense by 1796.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=idealism|title=idealism, n.|publisher=[[Online Etymological Dictionary]]}}</ref>
 
''IdealismИдеализам'' isје aизраз termса withнеколико severalсродних related meaningsзначења. ItДолази comes viaпреко [[LatinЛатински језик|латинске]] ''[[Идеја|idea]]'' from theиз [[Ancient Greek|старогрчке]] ''[[Идеја|idea]]'' (ἰδέα) fromиз -{''idein''}- (ἰδεῖν), meaningшто "toзначи see"„видети”. TheТермин termје enteredушао theу Englishенглески languageјезик byдо 1743.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.oed.com/view/Entry/90960|title=idealism, n.|publisher=[[Oxford English Dictionary]]}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idealism|title=idealism, n.|publisher=[[Merriam-Webster]]}}</ref> It[[Кристијан wasВулф first(филозоф)|Кристијан usedВулф]] inга theје abstract1747. metaphysicalпрви senseпут "beliefупотребио thatу realityапстрактном isметафизичком madeсмислу up„веровање onlyда ofстварност ideas"чине byсамо [[Christian Wolff (philosopher)|Christian Wolff]] in 1747идеје“.<ref name=SEP/> TheТермин termје re-enteredпоново theушао Englishу енглески languageјезик inу thisовом abstractапстрактном senseсмислу byдо 1796.<ref>{{cite web|url=https://www.etymonline.com/search?q=idealism|title=idealism, n.|publisher=[[Online Etymological Dictionary]]}}</ref>
In ordinary language, as when speaking of [[Woodrow Wilson]]'s [[idealism (international relations)|political idealism]], it generally suggests the priority of ideals, principles, values, and goals over concrete realities. Idealists are understood to represent the world as it might or should be, unlike [[pragmatism|pragmatists]], who focus on the world as it presently is. In the arts, similarly, idealism affirms imagination and attempts to realize a mental conception of beauty, a standard of perfection, juxtaposed to aesthetic [[Naturalism (philosophy)|naturalism]] and [[Philosophical realism|realism]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/idealism|title=Idealism - Define Idealism at Dictionary.com|work=Dictionary.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idealism|title=Idealism - Definition of Idealism by Merriam-Webster}}</ref> The term ''idealism'' is also sometimes used in a sociological sense, which emphasizes how human ideas—especially beliefs and values—shape society.<ref>{{cite book |title=Sociology 14th Edition |url=https://archive.org/details/sociologythediti00maci |url-access=limited |last=Macionis |first=John J. |year=2012 |publisher=Pearson |location=Boston |isbn=978-0-205-11671-3 |page=[https://archive.org/details/sociologythediti00maci/page/n119 88] }}</ref>
 
У обичном језику, као и када се говори о [[Idealism in international relations|политичком идеализму]] [[Woodrow Wilson|Вудроа Вилсона]], он генерално сугерише приоритет идеала, принципа, вредности и циљева над конкретним реалностима. За идеалисте се схватаја да представљају свет онаквим какав би могао или требао бити, за разлику од [[pragmatism|прагматичара]], који се фокусирају на свет какав он тренутно јесте. У уметности, на сличан начин, идеализам афирмише машту и покушава да оствари ментално поимање лепоте, стандард савршенства, супротно естетском [[Натурализам (филозофија)|натурализму]] и [[Realizam (filozofija)|реализму]].<ref>{{cite web|url=http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/idealism|title=Idealism - Define Idealism at Dictionary.com|work=Dictionary.com}}</ref><ref>{{cite web|url=http://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/idealism|title=Idealism - Definition of Idealism by Merriam-Webster}}</ref> Израз ''идеализам'' понекад се такође користи у социолошком смислу, који наглашава како људске идеје - нарочито веровања и вредности - обликују друштво.<ref>{{cite book |title=Sociology 14th Edition |url=https://archive.org/details/sociologythediti00maci |url-access=limited |last=Macionis |first=John J. |year=2012 |publisher=Pearson |location=Boston |isbn=978-0-205-11671-3 |page=[https://archive.org/details/sociologythediti00maci/page/n119 88] }}</ref>
Any philosophy that assigns crucial importance to the ideal or spiritual realm in its account of human existence may be termed "idealist". [[Metaphysics|Metaphysical]] idealism is an [[ontology|ontological]] doctrine that holds that reality itself is [[incorporeality|incorporeal]] or experiential at its core. Beyond this, idealists disagree on which aspects of the mental are more basic. [[Platonic idealism]] affirms that [[abstract object|abstractions]] are more basic to reality than the things we perceive, while [[subjective idealism|subjective idealists]] and [[phenomenalism|phenomenalists]] tend to privilege sensory experience over abstract reasoning. [[Epistemological idealism]] is the view that reality can only be known through ideas, that only psychological experience can be apprehended by the mind.<ref name="Brittanica">Daniel Sommer Robinson, [http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/281802/idealism "Idealism"], ''Encyclopædia Britannica''</ref><ref>In ''[[On The Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer noted the ambiguity of the word ''idealism'', calling it a "term with multiple meanings". For Schopenhauer, idealists seek to account for the relationship between our ideas and external reality, rather than for the nature of reality as such. Non-Kantian idealists, on the other hand, theorized about mental aspects of the reality underlying phenomena.</ref><ref>Philip J. Neujahr would "restrict the idealist label to theories which hold that the world, or its material aspects, are dependent upon the specifically cognitive activities of the mind or Mind in perceiving or thinking about (or 'experiencing') the object of its awareness." Philip J. Neujahr, ''Kant's Idealism'', Ch. 1</ref>
 
AnyСвака philosophyфилозофија thatкоја assignsпридаје crucialпресудну importanceважност toидеалном theили idealдуховном orподручју spiritualу realmсвом inопису itsљудског accountпостојања ofможе humanсе existenceназвати may be termed "idealist"„идеалистичком”. [[MetaphysicsМетафизика|MetaphysicalМетафизички]] idealism isидеализам anје [[ontology|ontologicalонтолошка]] doctrineдоктрина thatкоја holdsдржи thatда realityје itselfсама isстварност [[incorporeality|incorporealбестелесна]] orили experientialискуствена atу itsсвојој coreсржи. BeyondОсим thisтога, idealistsидеалисти disagreeсе onне whichслажу aspectsоко ofтога theкоји mentalсу areаспекти moreменталног basicосновнији. [[Platonic idealism|Платонски идеализам]] affirmsафирмише да thatсу [[abstract object|abstractionsапстракције]] areстварније moreод basicстварности toкоју reality than the things we perceiveопажамо, whileдок [[subjective idealism|subjectiveсубјективни idealistsидеалисти]] andи [[phenomenalism|phenomenalistsфеноменалисти]] tendимају toтенденцију privilegeда sensoryпривилегирају experienceчулно overискуство abstractнад апстрактним reasoningзакључивањем. [[Epistemological idealism|Епистемолошки идеализам]] isје theстав viewда thatсе realityстварност canможе onlyспознати beсамо knownпутем through ideasидеја, that only psychologicalда experienceсе canумом beможе apprehendedсхватити byсамо theпсихолошко mindискуство.<ref name="Brittanica">Daniel Sommer Robinson, [http://www.britannica.com/EBchecked/topic/281802/idealism "Idealism"], ''Encyclopædia Britannica''</ref><ref>In ''[[On The Freedom of the Will]]'', Schopenhauer noted the ambiguity of the word ''idealism'', calling it a "term with multiple meanings". For Schopenhauer, idealists seek to account for the relationship between our ideas and external reality, rather than for the nature of reality as such. Non-Kantian idealists, on the other hand, theorized about mental aspects of the reality underlying phenomena.</ref><ref>Philip J. Neujahr would "restrict the idealist label to theories which hold that the world, or its material aspects, are dependent upon the specifically cognitive activities of the mind or Mind in perceiving or thinking about (or 'experiencing') the object of its awareness." Philip J. Neujahr, ''Kant's Idealism'', Ch. 1</ref>
Subjective idealists like [[George Berkeley]] are [[anti-realism|anti-realists]] in terms of a mind-independent world, whereas [[transcendental idealism|transcendental idealists]] like [[Immanuel Kant]] are strong [[skepticism|skeptics]] of such a world, affirming epistemological and not metaphysical idealism. Thus Kant defines ''idealism'' as "the assertion that we can never be certain whether all of our putative outer experience is not mere imagining".<ref>Immanuel Kant, Notes and Fragments, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 318, {{ISBN|0-521-55248-6}}</ref> He claimed that, according to ''idealism'', "the reality of external objects does not admit of strict proof. On the contrary, however, the reality of the object of our internal sense (of myself and state) is clear immediately through consciousness".<ref>''Critique of Pure Reason'', A 38</ref> However, not all idealists restrict the real or the knowable to our immediate subjective experience. [[Objective idealism|Objective idealists]] make claims about a transempirical world, but simply deny that this world is essentially divorced from or ontologically prior to the mental. Thus, [[Plato]] and [[Gottfried Leibniz]] affirm an objective and knowable reality transcending our subjective awareness—a rejection of epistemological idealism—but propose that this reality is grounded in ideal entities, a form of metaphysical idealism. Nor do all metaphysical idealists agree on the nature of the ideal; for Plato, the fundamental entities were non-mental abstract [[Platonic idealism|forms]], while for Leibniz they were proto-mental and concrete [[monadology|monads]].<ref name="Stanford Leibniz">Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, "Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind", ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/</ref>
 
Субјективни идеалисти попут [[Џорџ Беркли|Џорџа Берклија]] су [[anti-realism|антиреалисти]] у смислу света независног од ума, док су [[transcendental idealism|трансцендентални идеалисти]] попут [[Immanuel Kant|Имануела Канта]] јако [[skepticism|скептични]] од таквог света, афирмишући епистемолошки, а не метафизички идеализам. Тако Кант дефинише ''идеализам'' као „тврдњу да никада не можемо бити сигурни да ли све наше наводно спољашње искуство није само замишљање“.<ref>Immanuel Kant, Notes and Fragments, ed. Paul Guyer, trans. by Curtis Bowman, Paul Guyer, and Frederick Rauscher, Cambridge University Press, 2005, p. 318, {{ISBN|0-521-55248-6}}</ref> Он је тврдио је да, према ''идеализму'', „стварност спољних објеката не признаје строге доказе. Напротив, међутим, стварност објекта нашег унутрашњег осећаја (мене и стања) је јасна одмах кроз свест”.<ref>''Critique of Pure Reason'', A 38</ref> Међутим, нису сви идеалисти ограничили стварно или спознатљиво на наше непосредно субјективно искуство. [[Objective idealism|Објективни идеалисти]] износе тврдње о трансемпиријском свету, али једноставно негирају да је овај свет у суштини разведен од или онтолошки пре менталног. Тако [[Платон]] и [[Готфрид Вилхелм Лајбниц|Готфрид Лајбниц]] потврђују објективну и спознатљиву стварност која надилази нашу субјективну свест - одбацивање епистемолошког идеализма - али предлажу да је та стварност утемељена на идеалним ентитетима, облику метафизичког идеализма. Сви метафизички идеалисти се не слажу око природе идеала; за Платона, фундаментални ентитети били су нементалне апстрактне форме, док су за Лајбница то биле протоменталне и конкретне [[monadology|монаде]].<ref name="Stanford Leibniz">Mark Kulstad and Laurence Carlin, "Leibniz's Philosophy of Mind", ''Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy'', http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/leibniz-mind/</ref>
As a rule, transcendental idealists like Kant affirm idealism's epistemic side without committing themselves to whether reality is ''ultimately'' mental; objective idealists like Plato affirm reality's metaphysical basis in the mental or abstract without restricting their epistemology to ordinary experience; and subjective idealists like Berkeley affirm both metaphysical and epistemological idealism.<ref name="Gron">{{cite encyclopedia |url= http://www.enotes.com/science-religion-encyclopedia/idealism|title=Idealism |author=ARNE GRØN |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Science and Religion |access-date=1 August 2011}}</ref>
 
По правилу, трансцендентални идеалисти попут Канта афирмишу епистемичку страну идеализма не обавезујући се у погледу питања да ли је стварност ''ултиматно'' ментална; објективни идеалисти попут Платона афирмишу метафизичку основу стварности у менталном или апстрактном смислу, не ограничавајући своју епистемологију на обично искуство; а субјективни идеалисти попут Берклија афирмишу метафизички и епистемолошки идеализам.<ref name="Gron">{{cite encyclopedia |url= http://www.enotes.com/science-religion-encyclopedia/idealism|title=Idealism |author=ARNE GRØN |encyclopedia=Encyclopedia of Science and Religion |access-date=1 August 2011}}</ref>
 
== Референце ==